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The legal analysis of the requirement to renounce one’s previous Community nationality upon naturalizing 
in  the  Member  State  of  residence  provides  an  excellent  pretext  to  speak  about  the  changing  balance 
between the nationalities of the Member States and the citizenship of the European Union. Amplifying 
global trends resulting in the fading in importance of state nationalities, the European integration project 
shaped a legal reality where the importance of particular Member States’ nationalities is dwarfed compared 
with that of EU citizenship. Currently the Member States’ nationalities, short of being abolished in the legal 
sense, mostly serve as access points to the status of EU citizenship. Besides, they provide their owners with 
a limited number of specific rights in deviation from the general principle of non-discrimination on the 
basis of nationality  and – what  is probably more important  for  the  majority  of their owners – trigger 
legalized discrimination in the wholly internal situations. Viewed in this light, the requirement to have only 
one Community nationality enforced in national law by ten Member States seems totally outdated and 
misplaced. While it is probably not per se illegal, it totally misses the point of European integration and 
ignores a simple fact that however much they struggle nationalities are unlikely to have a bright future in 
the EU. Once third country nationals are brought within the scope of this picture, even more pressing 
questions with regard to the EU citizenship / Member State nationality interaction come to the fore. 
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Introduction and the Structure of the Argument 
Giving up your previous nationality is an imperative part of the naturalization 
procedure in several Member States of the European Union (EU). While justifiable from 
the point of view of national, as well as international law, such a requirement potentially 
sits uneasily next to the concept of European citizenship and the idea of an ‘ever closer 
Union’ the Member States are striving to build.
1 Assessment of the requirement to give 
up  your  previous  Community  nationality
2 when  naturalizing  in  the  Member  State  of 
residence in the light of the growing importance of European Citizenship is the main 
focus of this paper. Building on the fast-growing literature analyzing citizenship in the 
context of globalization, this article will place the requirement of  renunciation of the 
original nationality in the general context of weakening of the legal meaning of ‘thick’ 
understandings of nationality, amplifying the nonsensical nature of the requirement in 
question. 
  The requirement to give up previous Community nationality potentially hinders 
the integration of European citizens into the society of the Member States other than their 
own and is a barrier on the way of wider political inclusion of Community national long-
term residents benefitting of virtually all other nationality rights on equal footing with 
those  EU  citizens  who  possess  the  local  nationality.  While  this  requirement  has  an 
obvious deterrent  effect on the naturalization
3 of a number of  European citizens in  a 
Member State other than their own, it also fails to achieve any identifiable goals. Clearly, 
European  citizens  residing  in  the  Member  State  other  than  their  Member  State  of 
nationality are not simply ‘foreigners’. The powers of the Member State of residence to 
discriminate against such people or deport them have been diminishing at an increasing 
pace during the last decades:
4 the Member States and the Court of Justice (ECJ) acting 
together  with  other  Institutions  of  the  Community  shaped  a  legal  reality  when  the 
citizenship of the European Union acquired clear and identifiable scope.
5 This status is 
usable in practice, changing the legal situation of the individual in possession of it. 
In such a context, treating a European citizen as any other ‘foreigner’  for the 
purposes of naturalization is not only unfair, but also goes against common sense. In the 
                                                    
1 This article thus sides with Evans (1991), 193 in condemning this requirement. It is surprising that this 
issue, which is of vital importance for thousands of EU citizens potentially qualifying for naturalisation in 
their Member State of residence but unwilling to give up their Community nationality has received so little 
scholarly attention in the recent decades. 
2 As opposed to the Citizenship of the European Union which is defined in Art. 17 EC, by ‘Community 
nationality’ is meant the status of national of one (or more) Member States of the European Union. 
3 Rubio-Marín, Ruth, ‘Transnational Politics and the Democratic Nation-State: Normative Challenges of 
Expatriate Voting and Nationality Retention of Emigrants’, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev., 2006, 117, 138. There is a 
general consensus in the literature that the requirement to give up previous nationality at naturalisation is an 
important disincentive.  
4 Kochenov,  Dimity, ‘Ius  Tractum of Many  Faces:  European  Citizenship and  a Difficult  Relationship 
between Status and Rights’, 15 Colum. J. Eur. L., 2009, 169, 193. 
5 For a very informative analysis of this process see Kostakopoulou, Dora, ‘Ideas, Norms and European 
Citizenship: Explaining Institutional Change’, 68 Modern L. Rev., 2005, 233, 244–261. See also Elsmore, 
Matthew J., and Starup, Peter, ‘Union Citizenship – Background, Jurisprudence, and Perspective: The Past, 
Present, and Future of Law and Policy’, 26 Ybk. Eur. L., 2007, 57; Jacobs, Francis G., ‘Citizenship of the 
European  Union  –  A  Legal  Analysis’,  13  Eur.  L.J.,  2007,  591;  Van  der  Mei,  Anne  Pieter,  ‘Union 
Citizenship  and  the  “De-Nationalisation”  of  the  Territorial  Welfare  State’,  7  European  Journal  of 
Migration and Law, 2005, 210. 3 
 
light  of  these  considerations,  the  legislation  of  the  Member  States  requiring  the 
denunciation of the previous (Community) nationality at naturalization (e.g. The Czech 
Republic,  Denmark,  Estonia,  Hungary,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  The  Netherlands,  Poland, 
Slovakia, Slovenia etc.
6) undermines the fundamental status of European citizenship and 
underscores the level of integration practically existing between the Member States. It is 
submitted  that  even  without  Community’s  intervention  –  as  it  is  potentially  not 
empowered to act in this field
7 – more and more Member States will follow the German 
example, applying the renunciation requirement to non-Community nationalities only.
8  
  The main aim of this paper not so much consists in finding the legal ways to 
outlaw the requirement to give up previous Community nationality upon naturalizing in 
the new Member State of residence, as in demonstrating the outdated logic underlying it, 
as well its harmful effects.
9 Of course, the requirement in question is directly connected 
with other problematic issues pertaining to the potential mine-field of EU citizenship and 
Member State nationality interactions. Among other such issues is a possibility, under 
national law of some Member States, to lose your nationality and Community citizenship 
as a result of military or civil service abroad,
10 automatic loss of your nationality, ex lege, 
upon  naturalization  abroad,
11 or  long-term  residence  abroad  (and  possession  of  other 
nationality)
12 to name just a few.
13 The loss of the main rights pertaining to nationality 
such as the right to vote is also possible as a consequence of changing one’s Member 
State.
14 
  There  is  a  potentially  more  important side  to  the  story  of  the  requirement  to 
denounce your previous Community nationality. It is rooted in the nascent differences in 
the  ways  towards  naturalisation  in  some  Member  States,  depending  on  whether  the 
applicant already possesses EU citizenship. At present Germany, Italy and Austria are 
                                                    
6 Liebich, Vink On the general context of dual nationality in the EU see Howard, Marc Morjé, ‘Variation in 
Dual Citizenship Policies in the Countries of the EU’, 39 Int’l Migration Rev., 3005, 697, esp. Table 4, at 
713. 
7 Art. 5(1) EC stipulates that the Community can only act ‘within the limits of the powers conferred upon it 
by [the EC Treaty] and of the objectives assigned therein’. 
8 de Groot and Vink (2008), 73–75. 
9 On the legal analysis of dual nationality see Boll, Alfred, M., Multiple Nationality and International Law, 
Leiden: Martinus  Nijhoff,  2007; Faist, Thomas, and  Kivisto,  Peter (eds.),  Dual Citizenship in Global 
Perspective,  London:  Palgrave,  2007;  Martin,  David  A.,  ‘New  Rules  on  Dual  Nationality  for  a 
Democratizing Globe: Between Rejection and Embrace’, 14 Geo Immigr. L.J., 1999, 1; Spiro, Peter J., 
‘Dual Nationality and the Meaning of Citizenship’, 46 Emory L.J., 1997, 1411; Bosniak, Linda, ‘Multiple 
Nationality and the Postnational Transformation of Citizenship’, 42 Va. J. Int’l L., 2002, 979. 
10 For an overview in the context of West European countries see de Groot and Vink (2008), 94–97. 
11 Such rules are in force in a number of Member States, including Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, 
Italy,  Lithuania  and  the  Czech  Republic.  Exceptions  apply.  See  TBN  2007/12  (Tussentijds  Bericht 
Natoinaliteiten), Staatscourant 2007/170. See also de Groot and Vink (2008), Table 4.1 at 85. The huge 
amount of exceptions that applies in the majority of these countries results in a situation when the loss of 
nationality can be regarded as an exception rather than the rule in the majority of these jurisdictions. 
12 For analysis see de Groot and Vink (2008), 89–94. In the majority of cases such loss of nationality is not 
automatic.  
13 For analysis see de Groot, Gerard-René, ‘Towards a European Nationality Law’, 8 Eur. J. Const. L., 
2004; Evans (1992). See also Hall, Stephen, ‘Loss of Union Citizenship in Breach of Fundamental Rights’, 
21 Eur. L. Rev., 1996, 129. 
14 For analysis see Kochenov, Dimitry, ‘Free Movement and Participation in the Parliamentary Elections in 
the  Member  State  of  Nationality:  An  Ignored  Link?',  16  Maastricht  J.  Eur.  &  Comp.  L.,  2009 
(forthcoming). 4 
 
among the Member States where naturalisation requirements for EU citizens and third 
country nationals are different. Only the latter, not the former, are expected to renounce 
their previous nationality to naturalise in Germany. In Italy and Austria, the length of 
minimal legal residence in order to qualify for naturalisation is drastically different for 
the two categories in question: while EU citizens naturalise in four years, third country 
nationals have to wait six years longer.
15 In the near future, the number of Member States 
to introduce such differences as well as the reach of the differences themselves is likely 
to proliferate.  
Such  developments  are  easy  to  predict,  given  the  rise  in  importance  of  EU 
citizenship and the practical richness of the rights it brings to those in possession of it. 
The  situation  of  EU  citizens  and  third  country  nationals  in  any  Member  State  is 
categorically  different,
16  allowing  to  speak  of  ‘unfulfilled  promise  of  European 
citizenship’.
17 Naturalisation in the Member State of residence is already potentially less 
important for EU citizens than for the third country nationals. This is so since a number 
of key rights formerly associated with state nationality are granted to EU citizens directly 
by the Community legal order. Among these are virtually unconditional rights of entry, 
residence,  taking  up  employment,  and,  crucially,  non-discrimination  on  the  basis  of 
nationality.
18 Objectively, it is evidently so that not so much is left of Member States’ 
nationalities in the EU. An oft-cited phrase coined by Davies attributes to Article 12 EC 
the abolition of nationality of the Member States.
19  
It takes Member States a long time to awaken to the realization of this state of 
affairs.  Once  realized  and  harkened
20 it  is  bound  to  have  direct  influence  on  their 
nationalization  rules. To  pretend  that  EU  citizens  are  not,  potentially  at  least,  quasi-
nationals of any of the Member States where they choose to reside, would be to close 
one’s eyes at the current stand of Community law. 
The  consequences  of  differentiating  between  EU  citizens  and  third  country 
nationals for the purposes of naturalisation are far-reaching indeed. Once EU citizenship, 
                                                    
15 Legge N. 91/1992; Austrian Nationality Act, FLG No. 311/1985. 
16 The Community and the Member States announced on a number of occasions that this difference is 
bound to be reduced, the third country nationals gradually coming to be treated as EU citizens. However, as 
Directive 2003/109/EC overwhelmingly demonstrates the differences are there to stay. For the assessment 
of the legal position of the third country nationals in the EU see e.g. Kochenov (2009) 225–229; Papagianni, 
Georgia,  ‘Free  Movement  of  Third  Country  Nationals  on  the  Eve  of  1  May  2004:  Another  Missed 
Deadline?’, in Hanf, Dominik and Muñoz, Rodolphe (eds.), La libre circulation des personnes: États des 
lieux et perspectives, Bruxelles: P.I.E. Peter Lang, 2007, 145; Hedemann-Robinson, Martin, ‘An Overview 
of Recent Legal Developments at Community Level in Relation to Third country Nationals Resident within 
the European Union, with Particular Reference to the Case-law of the European Court of Justice’, 38 
Common Mrkt. L. Rev., 2001, 525; Staples, Helen, The Legal Status of Third-country Nationals Resident in 
the  European  Union,  The  Hague:  Kluwer  Law  International,  1999;  Ward,  Ian,  ‘Law  and  the  Other 
Europeans’, 35 J. Common Mrkt. Stud. 1, 1997, 79; Peers, Steve, ‘Towards Equality: Actual and Potential 
Rights of Third-Country Nationals in the European Union’, Common Mrkt. L. Rev., 1996, 8. 
17 Maas, Willem, ‘Migrants, States, and EU Citizenship’s Unfulfilled Promise’, 12 Citizenship Stud., 2008, 
583. 
18 For critical analysis see Kochenov (2009), 206. 
19 Davies, Gareth, ‘“Any Place I Hang My Hat?” or: Residence is the New Nationality’, 11 Eur. L.J. 1, 
2005, 43, 55. Evans (1991) put it slightly differently: ‘possession of the nationality of one Member State 
rather than that of another loses all real significance’ (at. 195). 
20 Weiler, Joseph  H.H.,  The Constitution of Europe:  Do  the Clothes Have an  Emperor?, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999, 3. 5 
 
a  ius  tractum  status rooted in  the possession of a nationality  of one  of  the  Member 
States
21 starts to affect the rules of access to this very nationality, the circle is rounded up: 
the formerly ‘parasitic’
22 and ‘cynical’
23 nature of EU citizenship comes to be contested. 
The proverbial pie lands from the sky on the table,
24 leaving no place to other foods. 
 
*  *  * 
 
  This paper is structured as follows. The first part provides a very concise sketch 
of a world-scale shift away from the doctrine of insoluble allegiance and combating dual 
(multiple)  nationality  towards  allowing  individuals  more  freedom  of  choice  resulting 
inter  alia  in  a  more  permissive  approach  to  multiple  nationality.  As  a  general 
consequence of the rise of international human rights and the inevitable replacement of 
the thick conceptions of nationality with their liberal-minimalist counterparts
25 on the one 
hand and the rise in globalization and international migration on the other, national law 
on citizenship in the majority of liberal-democratic jurisdictions in the world is evolving 
in  two  seemingly  opposing  directions,  moving  towards  de-ethnicisation  and  re-
ethnicisation at the same time.
26 While citizenship is still meaningful, it is certainly not 
any more exclusive and even less connected with culture and identity (I.).  
The paper  proceeds looking  at the general processes outlined  in the  first part 
through the lens of European integration. A perfect example of amplified-globalization, 
the European integration project successfully created the conditions for overwhelming 
intensification of the world trends leading to the marginalization of nationality in the 
context of the borderless internal market, the adoption of the liberal ideals as the guiding 
stars  of  integration  by  the  ECJ  and  the  EU  Treaty
27 and  the  successful  shaping  of 
European citizenship. This section of the paper will build on the groundbreaking work of 
Davies
28 and  Tryfonidou,
29 overwhelmingly  relevant  for  outlining  the  vistas  of  EU 
citizenship  of  the  near  future  (II.).  The  part  that  follows  looks  specifically  at  the 
requirement to give up previous Community nationality upon naturalisation in the new 
Member State of residence which is on the books in several Member States. The negative 
                                                    
21 Art. 17 EC. Kochenov (2009) 181. 
22 Rostek, Karolina and Davies, Gareth, ‘The Impact of Union Citizenship on National Citizenship Policies’, 
10 EIoP 5, 2006, 1, reprinted in 22 Tul. Euro. Civ. LF, 2007, 89. 
23 Weiler,  Joseph  H.H.,  ‘European  Citizenship  and  Human  Rights’,  in  Winter,  Jan  A.  et  al.  (eds.), 
Reforming the Treaty on European Union – The Legal Debate, The Hague: Kluwer, 1996, 65, 68, speaking 
of a ‘cynical exercise in public relations on the part of the High Contracting Parties’. 
24 Jessurun d’Oliveira, Hans U., ‘Union Citizenship: Pie in the Sky?’, in Rosas, A. and Antola E. (eds.), A 
Citizens’ Europe: In Search for a New Order, London: Sage, 1995, 58. 
25 Joppke,  Christian,  ‘Immigration  and  the  Identity  of  Citizenship:  The  Paradox  of  Universalism’,  12 
Citizenship Stud., 2008, 533. 
26 Joppke,  Christian,  ‘Citizenship  between  De-  and  Re-Ethnicization  (I)’,  44  Archive  européen  de 
sociologie, 2003, 429. 
27 Esp. Arts. 6 and 7 EU. 
28 Davies, Gareth, ‘Services, Citizenship and the Country of Origin Principle’, Mitchell Working Paper 
Series, no. 2, 2007. 
29 Tryfonidou, Alina, Reverse Discrimination in Purely Internal Situations: An Incongruity in a Citizens’ 
Europe, 35 Legal Issues of Econ. Integration, 2008, 43; Tryfonidou, Alina, Reverse Discrimination in EC 
Law, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2009. 6 
 
impact of such requirement on the process of European integration is assessed in the 
context of the goals the states introducing it are willing to achieve (III.). 
The  paper  concludes  with  an  outline  of  the  likely  future  dynamics  in  the 
relationship  between  Member  State  nationality  and  European  citizenship,  as  well  as 
informed speculation on the likely evolution of the nature of the latter. The borderless 
context  of  internal  market  amplifying  world-wide  trends  is  likely  to  lead  to  an 
overwhelming diminution in the legal importance of nationality of the Member States as 
meaningful  legal  statuses.  However,  given  the  universality  of  the  trends  negatively 
affecting nationalities, it is clear that EU citizenship, while gaining in importance, should 
not be expected to become anything more than a thin procedure-driven concept, in line 
with the liberal credo espoused by the EU.
30 To expect demos-creation
31 or the rise in the 
feeling of belonging from the new status which led to the marginalizing the nationalities 
of the Member States would not only be unwise – given the world-wide trend towards 
marginalization  of  ‘thick’  citizenship  –  but  also  unnecessary.  Indeed,  while  the 
nationalities of the Member States are likely to end up stripped of any legal substance 
whatsoever, the feeling of belonging attached to them can very well stay, justifying their 
preservation  and  making  the  transfer  of  such  concepts  to  the  Community  level 
unnecessary. 
 
I.Liberalism and the Erosion of the Former Meaning of Nationality 
A hundred years ago, the prevailing views among lawyers and politicians all over 
the world ascribed bigger dangers to possessing two nationalities than to possessing two 
wives. In the words of Bancroft one should ‘as soon tolerate a man with two wives as a 
man with two countries: as soon bear with polygamy as that state of double allegiance 
which common sense so repudiates that it has not even coined a word to express it’.
32 
Ties with a state were seen as absolutely exclusive, and international law reflected this 
belief.
33 Dual  citizens  or  those  who  changed  their  nationality  were  regarded  with 
suspicion as potential traitors
34 and saw their rights limited compared with ‘natural born’ 
citizens.
35 
                                                    
30 Kostakopoulou, Dora, ‘Why Naturalisation?’, 4 Perspectives on Eur. Politics & Soc’y, 2003, 85. See also 
Zilbershats, Yaffa, ‘Reconsidering the Concept of Citizenship’, 36 Tex. Int’l L.J., 2001, 689, 714 (in the 
potential duty to grant citizenship to a resident of a state). 
31 For critical assessment see Weiler, Joseph H.H., ‘The State “über alles”: Demos, Telos and the German 
Maastricht  Decision’,  in Due,  Ole,  Lutter,  Marcus  and  Schwarze,  Jürgen (eds.),  Festschrift  für Ulrich 
Everling, Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Vol. 2, 1995. 
32 Bancroft,  George,  ‘Letter  to  Lord  Palmerson,  Jan.  26,  1849’,  reprinted  in  Sen.  Ex.  Docs.  38,  36
th 
Congress, 1
st Session, 1950, as cited in Howard (2005), 700. 
33 For  the analysis  see Bar-Yaacov,  Nissim,  Dual Nationality,  London: Stevens  and Sons, 1961. Bar-
Yaacov  opined  that  ‘dual  nationality  is  an  undesirable  phenomenon  detrimental  both  to  the  friendly 
relations between nations and the well-being of individuals concerned’ (at 4). Nothing could be less true 
today. 
34 For the remnants of it see Korematsu v. U.S. 323 U.S. 214 (1944). The case concerned the internment of 
all persons of Japanese  ethnicity residing in the West Coast of the US in the ‘Relocation Centres’ on 
military order during the Second World War. It did not matter whether these persons held US citizenship or 
not. 
35 The remnants of this rule are still the law in the US where citizenship by naturalisation brings with it less 
rights than citizenship by birth: US Constitution, Art. II. For analysis see Herlihy, Sarah P., ‘Amending the 7 
 
International  law  generally  left  it  up  to  the  states  to  decide  on  the  issues  of 
nationality,
36 and  concentrated  on  combating  double  nationality.
37 This  amplified  the 
romantic vision of a state as a cradle of a nation to which individuals belonged due to 
‘blood ties’,
38 thus taking a legal fiction very seriously.
39 The main activity of modern 
states
40 became confined to homogenising, linguistically,
41 culturally, and otherwise, the 
imagined communities,
42 to sell them to the citizens as an omnipresent unquestionable 
given.  Patriotic  ideals  prescribed  to  be  able  to  sacrifice  everything  for  this  fiction, 
equalling with heroism the loss of dignity and reasoned judgement (like being willing to 
hate, and, if needed, to kill, those belonging to another nation).
43 
There could not possibly be any place for multiple nationalities in a world divided 
into such states. Paradoxically, the freedom of states to decide who their nationals are, 
one of the holiest emanations of the principle of state sovereignty, necessarily resulted in 
the multiplication of people with more nationalities than one, whence the attempts of 
states, in the auspices of international law, to end this erosion of exclusivity. 
Although nation states are still ‘built on a rarely materialised idea of one territory 
and one nation’
44 very much has changed in the world of states since then. The times of 
the  reign  of  the  doctrine  of  insoluble  allegiance  establishing,  in  the  words  of  Sir 
Blackstone ‘a debt of gratitude which cannot be forfeited, cancelled or altered by any 
                                                                                                                                                           
Natural Born Citizen Requirement: Globalization as the Impetus and the Obstacle’, 81 Chi.-Kent L. Rev., 
2006, 275. In the context of European citizenship such distinctions are illegal. In Auer the ECJ found that 
‘there is no provision of the Treaty which, within the field of application of the Treaty, makes possible to 
treat nationals of a Member State differently according to the time at which or the manner in which they 
acquired the nationality of that State’: Case 136/78 Ministère Public v. Auer [1979] ECR 437, para 28. 
36 The 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws (L.N. 
Doc. C 24 M. 13.1931.V.), is unequivocally clear on this issue: ‘it is for each state to determine under its 
own  law who  are its  nationals’  (Art. 1). Art. 2  stipulates that ‘Any question  as  to whether a person 
possesses the nationality of a particular State shall be determined in accordance with the law of that State’. 
See also Kochenov (2009), 175 et seq. 
37 E.g. CoE Convention on Reduction of Cases of Multiple Nationality, (1963) ETS no. 43, entered into 
force in 1968; Protocol to this Convention (1977) ETS no. 96. Combating double nationality distracted 
attention from solving the problem of statelessness, which is still acute. Among the instruments addressing 
this issue see Protocol Relating to a Certain Case of Statelessness (1937-1938) 179 L.N.T.S. 115 (No. 
4138); Special Protocol Concerning Statelessness, League of Nations Document C. 227.M.114.1930.V; 
1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, (1975) 989 U.N.T.S. 175 (No. 14458). The document 
is only ratified by a handful of states.  For analysis see Chan (1991), 2 et seq., who is critical of the 
international legal developments in this area. 
38 In 1900 there was no jus soli in Europe – only jus sanguinis. Jus soli was reintroduced in order to draft 
more inhabitants, previously considered as foreigners, to the army: Joppke (2003), 436. 
39 Weil has compellingly demonstrated that nationality laws have nothing to do with the reflection of a 
concept of a nation: Weil, Patrick, Qu’est-ce qu’un Francais?, Paris: Grasset, 2002, 13. 
40 Hereafter ‘modern’ is used in its historical sense, not to be confused with ‘contemporary’. 
41 Linguistic homogeneity of the majority of states regarded by many as natural is a very recent product of 
state-building efforts. E.g. Eco, Umberto, La ricerca della lingua perfetta nella cultura europea, Roma: 
Laterza, 1993, 9.  
42 Anderson, Benedict, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (2
nd 
ed.), London: Verso, 1991. 
43 ‘In August 1914, Australians and Germans, Frenchmen and Englishmen, flooded the enlistment offices, 
but we would not want to explain their military enthusiasm by reference to the quality of their citizenship 
[but rather] as a sign of the poverty of their lives and their lack of moral independence’: Walzer, Michael, 
‘Civility and Civic Virtue in Contemporary America’, 41 Social Research 4, 1974, 593, 596. 
44 Hammar (1985), 440. 8 
 
change  of  time,  place  or  circumstance’
45 and  thus  making  either  acquiring  a  new 
nationality  or  changing  the  original  nationality  virtually  impossible,  are  long  gone. 
Naturalisation  and  the  change  of  nationality  are  both  legally  recognised  reality.  At 
present ‘there seems to be a general consensus that everyone is entitled to change his 
nationality’,
46  as well as possess dual or multiple nationality.  
The possibility to do this is a direct consequence of the change that has deeply 
affected the understanding of the very nature of states and nations. The flourishing of the 
modern states that led to numerous disasters in the 20
th century has been attributed to the 
poverty of the civil society that ‘lack[ed] the capacity to resist [the state’s] plans’.
47 The 
disasters of totalitarianism demonstrated with overwhelming clarity how dangerous states 
are
48 and that they should not be given a carte blanche in multiplying human misery 
justified by pursuing highly abstract goals rooted in quasi-religious
49 and very egoistic 
conceptions of the good, which would stop at the national boundaries ‘that specify, with 
dogmatic clarity, the distinction between the political community that is inside and the 
international anarchy that is outside’.
50 
Post WW II developments leading to the rise of international migration, as well 
as international marriages producing children directly disproving the dogma of unitary 
identities and exclusive nationhood,
51 coupled with the global rise of human rights and 
liberalism
52 made  it  impossible  for  states  to  remain  as  they  were.  The  states’  very 
authority over the nations came to be undermined, as state- and nation-building parted 
                                                    
45 Blackstone, William, Commentaries on the Laws of England, London, 1884, 117, cited in Rubinstein and 
Adler (2000), 519, 530. See also Spiro (1997), 1419–1430. 
46 Chan (1991), 8. For the accounts of this transformation see e.g. Brøndsted Sejersen, Tanja, ‘“I Vow to 
Thee My Countries” – The Expansion of Dual Citizenship in the 21
st Century’, 42 Int’l Migration Rev., 
2008, 523; Howard (2005), 700 et seq.; Zolberg, Aristide R., ‘The Dawn of Cosmopolitan Denizenship’, 7 
Ind. J. Global Legal Stud., 2000, 511; Rubinstein, Kim, ‘Citizenship in a Borderless World’, in Angie, 
Antony  and  Sturgess,  Garry  (eds.),  Legal  Visions  of  the  21
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47 James Scott, Seeing Like a State, New Heaven: Yale University Press, 1998, 89 (quoted in Joppke (2003), 
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48 This realisation is not new, as it is omnipresent in the Federalist papers. See also Sajó, András, Limiting 
Government: An Introduction to Constitutionalism, Budapest: Central European University Press, 1999. 
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50 Falk (2000), 6. 
51 The  proliferation  of liberal  ideology  caused similar developments  also  in other spheres. Just  as  the 
dogmatic construct of ‘nation’, the notions of ‘race’ and ‘family’ undergo mutation. Acceptance of dual 
nationality and multiple identities can thus be compared with the acceptance of interracial marriage, as well 
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and states. 
52 Rawls, John, Political liberalism, New York: Columbia University Press, 1993; Sandel, M., ‘Review of 
Political Liberalism’, 107 Harv. L. Rev., 1994, 1765. Joppke (2008) provides an excellent summary of the 
idea applying it to the context of nationality (at 534–536) 9 
 
ways.
53 Liberal ideology made it impossible for the states to continue embracing a clear 
idea of who their nationals should be, trashing any ‘thick’ conceptions of nationality.
54 In 
fact, democratic  states effectively  lost any  legal possibility to  imagine  themselves as 
rooted in homogeneous monocultural societies, unable to ask of their own nationals nad 
of the growing numbers of new-comers anything more than mere respect for the liberal 
ideology.  Relying  on  Habermas
55 and  Rawls
56 Joppke  sketches  the  essence  of  this 
transformation in the following way: ‘in a liberal society the ties that bind can only be 
thin and procedural, not thick and substantive. Otherwise individuals could not be free’.
57 
Nationality as such came to be stripped of any substantive elements, ‘good’ or ‘bad’.
58 
This is great news, since states do not view themselves in a position anymore to 
decide how their citizens are supposed to look like, how to behave, and what to think. As 
long as the state-espoused view that a citizen should be either a hard-working member of 
the ‘Socialist community’,
59 or a person ‘of German or kindred blood’,
60 or someone who 
‘by virtue of conscription […] attain[s] and enjoy[s] the fruits of full citizenship’,
61 or 
must genuinely believe in the liberal Constitution,
62 became impossible, nationality itself 
has no ethno-cultural component to it any more, at least not legally speaking. Nationality 
has  been  reinvented  in  a  procedural  vein,  becoming  merely  a  ‘Kopplungsbegriff’
63 
connecting  a  state  and  a  person.  The  old  quasi-religious  and  potentially  chauvinistic 
meaning of nationality is severely undermined.
64 
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61 Murray, Melissa, ‘When War Is Work: The B.I. Bill, Citizenship, and the Civic Generation’, 96 Cal. L. 
Rev., 2008, 967, 996. 
62 The German Federal Constitutional Court ruled that citizens are ‘legally not required to personally share 
the values of the Constitution’: Joppke (2008), 542. To find otherwise would be in contradiction with the 
very rationale of a contemporary liberal state.  
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Proceduralisation of the idea of nationality means that lacking certain mythical 
characteristics of a ‘good citizen’ cannot cause either deprivation of nationality or block 
access to naturalization, as ‘“abstract character” of state membership […] is decoupled 
from  rights  and  identity’.
65  Inescapably  connected  with  the  abstract  character  of 
contemporary  state  membership  is  the  idea  of  fairness  of  the  potential  comparisons 
between citizens by birth and  to-be-citizens  by  naturalisation:  asking  the latter to be 
smarter, richer or better looking (as far as the state can judge) while simply embracing the 
former would not be entirely correct it seems.
66 
As a consequence, when liberal democracies refer to ‘being one of us’, their 
‘particularlism’ is necessarily bound to stop at the restatement of liberal values: there is 
no  more  such  thing  as  differences  between  ‘Britishness’,  ‘Frenchness’,  ‘Danishness’ 
etc.,
67 as ‘the national particularisms which immigrants and ethnic minorities are asked to 
accept across European states, are but local versions of the universalistic idiom of liberal 
democracy’,
68  making  the  logic  of  ‘naturalisation’  for  the  new-comers  somewhat 
outdated if not totally misplaced.
69 Once the dream of monocultural national unity was 
gone,  it  became  impossible  to  deny  the  possibility  of  different  co-existing  levels  of 
identity in the populace, if not in one person.
70 
  As  a  result of the proliferation of international migration and  liberal human 
rights-oriented states, nationality, besides becoming merely a procedural connection, is 
getting  detached both  from  the  idea  of  territory  and  from  the  idea  of  culturally  and 
ethnically  homogeneous  national  community  –  both  being  necessary  components  of 
‘what a state essentially is’.
71 The mutation of nationality is thus rooted in the binary 
nature  of  states:  both  territorial  and  Volk-based  units.
72 Joppke  describes  the  recent 
dynamics in terms of simultaneous de- and re-ethnicization of nationality.
73 The former 
refers to the acceptance of naturalisation and immigration which are not based on the idea 
of assimilation,
74 resulting in the proliferation of diverse ethnic and cultural communities 
within states – a situation impossible in the modern world of homogeneous nations.
75 The 
latter refers to the increasing willingness of states to confer citizenship on the offspring of 
nationals who left the territory. In the recent decades the majority of European states 
moved  in  both  opposing  directions  described,  which  resulted  in  a  process  of  ‘de-
territorialisation of politics’,
76 and, naturally, of states. 
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Press, 1995. 
71 Joppke (2003), 431. 
72 Joppke (2003), 443, 454. 
73 Joppke (2003), 430. 
74 France is the only Western democracy keeping a reference to assimilation on the books: Joppke (2003), 
440. See also Lagarde, Paul, La nationalité française, Paris: Dalloz, 1997, 131. 
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  As a direct consequence of nationality’s movement in two opposing directions 
states came to be more tolerant to each-other’s nationals naturalizing in their territory and 
keeping the previous nationality. A truly  ‘veranderde omgeving’
77 was created, as the 
majority  of  liberal  democracies  in  the  world  moved  towards  accepting  multiple 
nationality  in  one  way  or  another,  and  the  international  consensus  on  this  issue  has 
certainly changed compared with the era of exclusivity.
78 Multiple nationality became 
‘the norm rather than exception’.
79 In Europe, the Council of Europe’s Convention on the 
Reduction of the Cases of Multiple Nationality and on Military Obligations in Cases of 
Multiple  Nationality  (1963),
80 which  followed  the  old,  now  obsolete  consensus,  as 
follows already from the name, became a radically different instrument upon the entry 
into force of the Second Protocol, which normalizes both naturalization in the state of 
residence and conservation of the nationality of origin.
81 The same permissive liberal 
trend is to be found in the Council of Europe’s Convention on Nationality of 1997.
82 
Indeed, agreeing with Jessurun d’Oliveira, it is clear that ‘being coerced to retain only a 
single  nationality  is  [in]compatible  with  liberal  principles’.
83  Differences  remain, 
however, with regard to approaching dual nationality in the context of de-ethnicisation as 
opposed  to  re-ethnicisation.  New-comers  naturalizing  in  a  state  are  often  treated 
differently compared with outgoing citizens naturalizing elsewhere in the world.
84  
With the growth of international migration in the liberal context where states are 
bound to exercise self-restraint in nation-building, it became apparent that ‘the paradigm 
of societies organised within the framework of the nation-state inevitably loses contact 
with reality’.
85 ‘Cosmopolitanism’ has clearly lost the formerly exotic appeal of the 19
th 
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century and has become a daily reality,
86once a consensus has been reached on a simple 
fact that numerous identities can overlap
87  and the legal fiction of belonging to a nation 
as the measure of all things, loosened. In fact, life simply seems to be returning to normal 
once states left their citizens alone in peace as they are, instead of attempting to mold 
them in accordance with the state-sanctioned citizenship ideal.  
European citizenship itself, in not repealing but complementing national citizenship 
as specified in Article 17(1) EC and in the Danish Declaration appended to the Maastricht 
Treaty,
88 is also a definitive step in the direction of the legal affirmation of the reality of 
multiple identities and numerous overlapping allegiances.
89 Today, the most active part 
of the world population has lived abroad for a considerable amount of time and is likely 
to hold more than one passport. For more and more people national borders are genuinely 
irrelevant.  This  makes  it  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  wholeheartedly  to  embrace  the 
fictions taught to our great-grand fathers by the public school systems of the day. School 
curricular research in the Western world demonstrates that the idea of national glory – the 
corner stone of the school programmes of the past – is supplanted. 
90 
It  is possible to envisage a  future where ‘container theory of  society’ is totally 
undermined and the dichotomy insider/outsider does not work.
91 The de-territorialisation 
of states and societies as well as the failing links between nationality on the one hand and 
particular culture and identity on the other call into question the whole construct of the 
world as we know it, leading to the ‘second age of modernity’




II.Nationality in EU Context: Diminishing in Importance Amplified 
  The normative foreigner-citizen dichotomy questioned at the world scale
94 is short 
of being eliminated in the European Union with regard to the nationals of the Member 
                                                    
86 Appiah, Kwame Anthony, Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers, New York: W.W.Norton, 
2007. 
87 Kymlicka (1995). 
88 OJ C348/4, 1994. 
89 However, the combination of European citizenship with the nationality of a Member State clearly does 
not  amount  to  dual  nationality:  Jessurun  d’Oliveira,  Hans  U.,  ‘Europees  burgerschap:  Dubbele 
nationaliteit?’, in van Ballegooij, Wouter F.W. (ed.), Europees Burgerschap, The Hague: T.M.C. Asser 
Press, 2004, 91. 
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91 For the analysis of relevant literature see Calavita, Kitty, ‘Law, Citizenship, and the Construction of 
(Some) Immigrant “Others”’, 30 Law & Soc. Inquiry, 2005, 401, 405–409. 
92 Beck, Ulrich, ‘The Cosmopolitan Perspective: Sociology of the Second Age of Modernity’, 51 British 
Journal of Sociology, 2000, 79. 
93 See Allott, Philip, The Health of Nations: Society and Law beyond the State, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University  Press,  2002.  It  is  reasonable  to  agree  with  Bosniak  in  this  context,  who  cautions  against 
interpreting the proliferation of multiple nationality as ‘postnatoinality’: the states, however reinvented and 
stripped  of  their  former  exclusivity,  are  here  to  stay:  Bosniak,  Linda,  ‘Multiple  Nationality  and  the 
Postnational Transformation of Citizenship’, 42 Va. J. Int’l L., 2002, 979. 
94 Brøndsted Sejersen (2008), 524. The signs to this erosion are not only seen in the equality of legally 
resident  foreigners  with citizens  in  the majority  of  spheres  ranging  from non-discrimination to  social 
security. Recent decisions of international tribunals also demonstrated that the international human rights 
protection regime can stand on the way of the use by states of the previously unconditional right to deport 13 
 
States. Even before the formal introduction of the concept of European citizenship by the 
Treaty of Maastricht, the likely depth of influence of the European integration project on 
the  nationalities  of  the  Member  States  was  apparent.
95 It  is  now  getting  constantly 
amplified. 
At present, European citizenship grants individuals in possession of this status a 
constantly growing amount of  rights, some of  which were previously associated with 
state nationalities only. These rights touch upon the core of understanding of citizenship, 
moving a number of areas of regulation previously considered to belong to the vital core 
of national sovereignty, away from the jurisdiction of the Member States, handling them 
over to the Community. These rights concern, first of all, the right to enter state territory 
and the right to remain, accompanied by the right to work, open a business, and bring in 
your family of any nationality.
96 A classical understanding of nationality would reserve 
this block of rights to the nationals only.
97 Another, equally important right concerns non-
discrimination  on  the  basis of  nationality within the material scope of  application of 
Community law established by lex generalis Article 12 EC and a number of lex specialis 
instruments.
98 Just as in the case of the previous example, a classical understanding of 
nationality would reserve these rights to the nationals only.
99 
Article 19 EC establishes the application of the non-discrimination on the basis of 
nationality  logic also  within  the sphere of  political  participation rights, providing  for 
rights to vote and run for office for all EU citizens legally resident in the Member States 
other  than  their  own  on  the  equal  basis  with  the  locals.
100 Two  levels  of  political 
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het verbod van discriminatie naar nationaliteit sinds Amsterdam?’, Sociaal-economische wetgeving, no. 12, 
2005, 502; Epiney, Astrid, ‘The Scope of Article 12 EC: Some Remarks on the Influence of European 
Citizenship’, 13 Eur. L.J., 2007, 611, esp. fn 4 at page 612, listing the recent case-law of the ECJ most 
relevant for the interpretation of Art. 12 EC. 
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representation  are  covered:  local  elections
101 and  EP  elections.
102 The  national,  most 
important,  level  of  political  representation  is  a  glaring  omission  in  this  context.
103 
Providing access to ‘rights conferred by [EC] Treaty’,
104 EU citizenship effectively takes 
over the vital substance of rights and entitlements popularly associated with nationality. 
Viewed in this context, Closa’s opinion that ‘citizenship of the Union adds new rights to 
those  enjoyed  by  nationals  from  Member  States  without  this  implying  currently  any 
meaningful  derogation  of  nationality’
105 does  not  appear  to  reflect  reality  any  more. 
While nationalities are still there, the addition of EU citizenship simply dwarfed them in 
importance.  
  The possible limitations of EU citizenship rights are interpreted by the ECJ very 
strictly.
106 Practically speaking, the Member States are not given any possibility to abuse 
the  grounds  for  derogations  provided  for  in  the  Treaty.
107 Moreover,  even  in  the 
situations  where  the  Member  States  do  not  rely  on  derogations,  their  possibility  to 
undermine the rights of EU citizens are minimised by the ECJ. The Court made it clear 
that  Article  18  EC,  granting  EU  citizens  a  general  free  movement  right,  although 
allowing  for  derogations,
108 cannot give rise  to secondary legislation which would,  if 
applied strictly, undermine the provision itself.
109 In practice, it means that the Court 
interprets  the  relevant  secondary  law
110  constantly  keeping  in  mind  the  principles 
established by Part II EC dealing with European citizenship. This approach has resulted 
in substantial growth in importance of the status of EU citizenship
111 and limited the 
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Member States’ ability to act in the cases when they seemingly ‘enforce the law’.
112 
Consequently,  EU citizens cannot  be  automatically  deported  from their new  Member 
State  of  residence  upon  failing  to  demonstrate  compliance  with  the  provisions  of 
secondary law;
113 the requirement to have sufficient resources is interpreted in such a 
way that the Member States are not permitted to actually check how much money EU 
citizens have;
114 permanent banishment of an EU citizen from a particular Member State 
is prohibited.
115 What is even more important, once residence in a new Member State is 
established,
116 non-discrimination on the basis of nationality applies to EU citizens even 
in the cases when they objectively fail to meet the minimal requirements of secondary 
law necessary to establish residence at the moment of the dispute.
117  
  The pro-citizenship  position  embraced by  the  Court  ensured  that  the  Member 
States are not able, legally, to deprive EU citizens of their rights using either Treaty 
derogations or ‘strict application’ of secondary Community law as a pretext. The EU 
citizenship status can even be used against one’s own Member State of nationality as the 
introduction of obstacles to free movement of persons, even non-discriminatory ones, is 
prohibited  in  EC  law.
118 The  goal-oriented  reading  of  the  relevant  Community  law 
instruments prevails. In practice this means that de jure free movement right is basically 
absolute  –  to  depart  from  it,  the  Member  States  need  to  be  able  to  demonstrate 
compelling reasons. All this shaped a legal reality where the Member States lost the 
ability to decide who will reside and work in their territory, who need to be sent away, 
and – what is probably more painful for some – find themselves in a situation where 
privileging their own nationals vis-à-vis other EU citizens is illegal. 
Given the current state of development of the European Union, a question that 
naturally arises is what is actually left of the nationalities of the Member States? Davies’ 
answer is clear: ‘abolished’.
119 And this is the right answer. Agreeing with Vink, ‘for 
Union citizens residing in one of the [...] EU  Member States it becomes increasingly 
irrelevant that they are non-citizens or aliens’.
120 Yet, possession of a particular Member 
State’s nationality can be important for EU citizens on some occasions. 
Possession of a particular Member State’s nationality has legal consequences for 
European citizens mostly in three cases. Firstly, and most importantly, it brings with it an 
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entitlement to vote and stand for election at the national level of political representation. 
Secondly, it allows qualifying for the jobs in public service
121 in derogation from the non-
discrimination principle of Article 39 EC.
122 However, the ECJ interprets this derogation 
narrowly, meaning that  the majority of  jobs  with  the state administration at different 
levels are not reserved to EU citizens possessing particular nationalities.
123 Thirdly, the 
nationality of a particular Member State theoretically provides the owner of this status 
with unconditional access to the territory of the Member State in question.
124 The latter is 
an almost fictious right at the moment, as the borders between the Member States do not 
exist for  EU citizens  and,  in the majority of cases, are not present physically either. 
Adding to the fictious character of this right, are the obligations assumed by the Member 
States under the law of the Third Pillar of the EU. Unconditional access to the territory 
does not mean, for instance, that a territory of a Member State can become safe haven for 
a  national  who  committed  a  crime  elsewhere  in  the  Union.  The  European  Arrest 
Warrant
125 is yet another sign of the general trend towards erosion of nationality in the 
Community.  
  Political  inclusion  at  the  national  level,  civil  service  employment  and  the 
unconditional right to cross a non-existent border are positive rights attached to each 
Member State’s nationality. They potentially empower individuals possessing a particular 
nationality notwithstanding (and obviously in legalised breach of) the equality principle 
of Article 12 EC and the spirit of the Treaties. 
There is also a possible negative side to possessing a particular Member State’s 
nationality. Member States’ nationalities have a potential of undermining the rights of 
their  owners.  This  paradoxical  situation  is  a  direct  consequence  of  one  of  the  main 
functions of Member States’ nationality in Community law: Member State nationality has 
a potential to activate reverse discrimination. Only those in possession of the nationality 
of the Member State of residence can legally be discriminated against in the Community, 
as the possession of the status of EU citizen alone is not enough, according to the ECJ, in 
order to fall within the scope ratione materiae of Community law.
126 Consequently, while 
discrimination on the basis of nationality is outlawed in the situations covered by the 
Treaty,
127 it is legal outside the Treaty’s scope even when EU citizens suffer from it.
128 
The Court has done a lot in order to remedy this drawback inherent in the law in 
force. At present it is not necessary to cross borders any more, for instance, in order to 
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fall within the scope of Community law and thus benefit from the non-discrimination 
principle.
129 Possession of second Community nationality helps.
130 
Geelhoed and other eminent  scholars  argued that  little can be done to  outlaw 
reverse  discrimination  in  the  wholly  internal  situations  under  the  present  Treaty 
regime:
131 those in possession of nationality of the Member State of residence are very 
much likely to be treated worse than other EU citizens residing in the same Member State 
also in the future. In fact, it seems that the very logic of market integration in the EU 
contradicts  the  ideal  of  equality  inherent  in  the  notion  of  citizenship,
132 as  the  non-
discrimination  principle  of  Article  12  EC  does  not  have  a  self-standing  value  in 
connection with the status of EU citizenship and has to be ‘activated’ separately from 
it.
133 Davies made a compelling demonstration of the clash between equality and market 
freedoms using the Services Directive
134 as a case study.
135 Regrettably, this clash covers 
a wide array of other issues too.
136 
Unlike Geelhoed, who simply takes the future legality of reverse discrimination 
for granted,
137 a number of scholars moved towards systemic criticism of the current state 
of affairs in  the nationality non-discrimination law  in the EU.
138 The  groundbreaking 
analysis provided by Tryfonidou
139 makes a simple but powerful point echoing Davies’ 
plea  for  equality  among  EU  citizens  and  the  optimistic  Opinions  written  by  the 
Advocates General at the dawn of the citizenship era in Community law.
140 Agreeing 
with Tryfonidou, it is indeed so that the reverse discrimination concept, pre-citizenship in 
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nature, simply does not take EU citizenship status as a legally meaningful construct into 
account. So while serving well in the context of pure economic integration, in the Union 
of citizens it is entirely out of place. In fact, the application of the concept effectively 
comes down to punishing those who do not contribute to the internal market – as they and 
they alone are worse off as a result of its application.
141  Once a Marktbürger is replaced 
with a citoyen the same logic is not applicable any more. Equality is bound to come to the 
fore, should we use the term ‘citizenship’ seriously.
142 
Comparing the number of EU citizens who fall within the scope ratione personae 
of  Community  law  with  the  number  of  those  who  do  not,  the  main  function  of  the 
Member State nationalities in Community law, connected with the activation of reverse 
discrimination becomes clear (statistically at least). More EU citizens stay in their own 
Member States, caught by reverse discrimination by virtue of possessing the nationality 
of that, not some other Member State. This is a high price for the exclusive access to the 
ballot. 
In the context of the legal assessment of the Member States’ nationalities in the 
light of Community law  it should not be forgotten  that EU  citizenship draws  on  the 
nationalities of the Member States as its separate acquisition is impossible.
143 Precisely 
because EU citizenship is ultimately a secondary status the power of the Member States 
is severely weakened, since while each one of them taken separately can have an illusion 
that  it  controls  access  to  EU  citizenship,  taken  together  they  do  not,  as  long  as  the 
naturalisation regimes are not harmonised. Huge disparities between the citizenship laws 
of all the Member States
144 all lead to the acquisition of the same status of European 
citizenship  which,  as  has  been  demonstrated  above,  has  effectively  overtaken  the 
majority of the main attributes of nationality from the national level. 
In a borderless Union it means that twenty seven approaches to acquiring the 
same  status  applicable  in  all  the  Member  States  are  in  existence.
145 In  the  light  of 
federalism’s potential to enhance human rights,
146 the discrepancy between nationality 
legislation in different Member States is highly beneficial for those willing to naturalise. 
Third country nationals are free to choose the Member State where the access to the 
nationality is framed in the most permissive terms, in order to move to their ‘dream 
Member State’ later, in their capacity of EU citizens. Obviously, comparing the amount 
of rights brought by EU citizenship with that brought by the nationality of a particular 
Member State it becomes clear that at present ‘for third country nationals residing in the 
EU it is becoming increasingly irrelevant in which Member State to naturalize’.
147 The 
main status they are likely to benefit from, in any event, will be EU citizenship, not the 
particular Member State’s nationality. 
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The legal disorder in the EU citizenship law at the moment, which caused by the 
lack of Community powers to decide by itself who its citizens are is beneficial for both 
main stake-holders affected. The Member States are happy to pretend that they regulate 
the  issues  of  access  to  EU  citizenship,  while  they  are  not,
148 and  the  candidates  for 
inclusion benefit from the differences in regulation of the issue of access to nationality 
existing  between  the  Member  States.  Almost  nobody  seems  to  suffer  from  this 
arrangement. Consequently, it seems that the proposals for harmonisation of Community 
citizenship  law
149 that  would  lead  to  the  effective  loss  by  the  Member  States  of  the 
capacity to regulate access to their nationalities alone seem to be misplaced, as they are 
likely to lead to stricter regulation on average in the EU-27 compared with that in place in 
the most liberal Member States.
150 
  Besides the inability of the Union to deliver on the promise of equality among 
citizens  inherent  in  the  citizenship  status  there  is  another  problem  plaguing  the 
development of EU citizenship at the moment. This problem is directly related to its 
uniquely  ius  tractum  nature.  A  great  number  of  third  country  nationals  permanently 
residing in the Community are excluded from this status, creating a situation where the 
division between those in possession of EU citizenship and third country nationals is by 
far  more  important  that  that  between different  Member  States’  nationalities.
151 Third 
country nationals are largely left within the realm of national law of the Member States. 
For them, borderless internal market is only a myth, as it does not shape their situation 
directly.  Although  limited  free  movement  rights  are  now  granted  to  this category  of 
residents,
152 all  in  all  the  gap  between  the  rights  of  third  country  nationals  and  EU 
citizens (no matter of which nationality) is enormous. They live in the same Union with 
EU citizens and equally contribute to its flourishing, yet the legal protections applicable 
to them in Community law are minimal indeed. Clearly ‘where the borders between the 
Member States are non-existent, preserving them on paper exclusively for third country 
nationals seems not only impractical but also unjust’:
153 the next challenge of Community 
citizenship law should be the incorporation of this group.  
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  This is where certain powers of the Community in the sphere of direct conferral of 
Community citizenship might be of great assistance. Almost twenty years ago Evans has 
compellingly  argued  for  ‘desirable  relaxation  of  the  link  between  possession  of  the 
nationality  of  a  Member  States  and  enjoyment  of  citizenship  rights  in  that  Member 
State’.
154 While it is difficult to disagree with this suggestion, it seems that the Member 
States will need to proceed in this direction very carefully, as full harmonisation would, 
like Janus, have double-faced consequences – negative ones. Firstly, the easier ways to 
naturalisation present in the law of some Member States will be liquidated: virtually any 
harmonisation means application of stricter requirements, as all the Member States come 
with their own fears and concerns. Secondly, harmonisation would result in nothing short 
of the de jure abolition of Member States’ nationalities. Although de facto they are not 
legally meaningful already, besides granting access to the EU citizenship status, selling 
such an arrangement to the member states’ populations would be difficult. As often, a 
mid-way solution could be an option. Imagine EU citizenship which can be acquired by 
third country nationals meeting certain Community requirements and, equally, by way of 
possessing a nationality of one of the Member States. 
The core challenges of European citizenship law thus mainly lie in two fields. The 
first is the ensuring of equal treatment of EU citizens no matter which nationality they 
possess: those who never used Community rights and thus do not fall within the scope of 
Community law according to the present-day orthodox interpretation of the Treaty cannot 
be treated worse than those who live in the same Member State and possess a different 
nationality. The second challenge consists in trying to bridge the divide existing between 
EU citizens on the one hand and third country nationals residing in the Union on the other.  
The success of the integration project to-date and, particularly, the centre-stage 
position  which  the  legal  status  of  EU  citizenship  came  to  occupy  resulted  in  the 
amplification of the world-wide trends of market-related and cultural globalisation and 
undermined the holy cow of nationality in a much more severe way than the results of 
similar processes taking place outside of the EU legal framework. In this context the 
nationalities of the Member States came to be de facto abolished and only remain legally 
consequential in several cases, of which three are the most important ones and include 
two positive and one negative. The positive ones are confined to political representation 
at the national level and access to the pool of jobs reserved for those possessing the local 
nationality. The negative one consists in the activation of reverse discrimination.  
   
III.Exchanging European Citizenship for European Citizenship and the 
Future of Nationality/EU Citizenship Interaction 
  At  least  ten  out  of  twenty-seven  Member  States  of  the  EU  demand  that  EU 
citizens willing to naturalise there renounce their previous Community nationality. Given 
that  the  states’  competence  to  decide  who  their  citizens  are  is  respected  both  in 
international law and in Community law, this requirement seems legal at the first glance. 
This  is  so  even  in  the  light  of  the  obiter  dictum  in  Micheletti
155 that  decision  on 
nationality  should  be  taken  by  the  Member  States  with  ‘due  regard  of  Community 
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156 At a closer look, however, this requirement is both non-sensical and potentially 
harmful. 
The  recent  developments  in  the  international  and  European  legal  climate 
described in sections I and II supra resulted in the reinvention of the legal essence of 
nationality  in  terms  of  merely  a  procedural  connection  between  the  individual  in 
possession  of  this  status  and  a  state.  At  this  point  it  would  be  entirely  incorrect  to 
interpret nationality as a legal status which is in direct connection with the idea of a 
‘nation’ in socio-cultural terms, as liberal democracies have effectively  forfeited their 
ability  to  promote  any  ‘thick’  understandings  of  nationality  among  both  their  own 
citizenry and the new-comers willing naturalise. Indeed, asking of anything more than the 
embrace of the liberal-democratic ideals on which all the Member States of the Union are 
officially based – as well as knowledge of the state language for the convenience of the 
citizens themselves – would be in blunt violation of the liberal essence of contemporary 
democracies. Unlike a century ago, all the conditions are potentially being created to 
accommodate diversity among the citizenry, rather than punish those unable to share the 
majoritarian  ideas. The  ‘integration’  policies  designed by  the  Member  States  for  the 
facilitation of the new-comers’ entry into the body of nationals expectedly came to be 
stripped of any nation-specific features. The accounts of integration policies provided by 
the  Member  States  themselves  make  this  point  quite  clear:  there  are  no  differences 
between ‘Danishness’, ‘Britishness’,  ‘Frenchness’ etc. And, for the  reasons explained 
above,  there  cannot  possibly  be.  The  similarities  are  abundant  however,  as  all  the 
requirements which the newcomers are presented with as ‘nation-specific’ are in fact 
tailored to reflect the liberal nature of contemporary Western democracies. Consequently, 
substantive differences  between  any  of  the nationalities  in  the  EU  do  not  exist  (and 
cannot),  as long as  nationality is  interpreted in  the  only  legally mandated  way:  as  a 
procedural connection. 
While  the  similarities  between  the  substances  of  all  the  Member  States’ 
nationalities in the EU are thus overwhelming, the differences, if at all decipherable, are 
negligible.  This  state  of  affairs  is  also  reflected  in  EU  law,  where  Article  6(1)  EU 
provides a clear reference to the whole array of legal principles which are ultimately 
responsible for the erosion of the modern meaning of nationality. Any departure from the 
liberal principles which are currently shared by the Member States is also likely to be 
punished with the use of Article 7 EU. In other words, the EU as such is also able to 
contribute to the preservation of nationality as a purely procedural connection, since an 
introduction  of  far-reaching  requirements  substantively  shaping  the  citizenry,  akin  to 
those  employed  by  the  inter-bellum  autocracies  or  Communist  regimes  will  be  in 
immediate violation of the core principles the Union is built on. Clearly, the Member 
States are unable to reverse this trend. 
The procedural nature of nationality is not the only important factor substantially 
influencing its substance. The scope of the rights associated with it is another important 
factor to  be  taken into  account.  Once the  effects  of the  European citizenship  on  the 
Member States’ nationalities are analysed, the differences between particular Community 
nationalities become even tinier. In the world outside the EU – at least as far as liberal 
democratic states are concerned – the thick meaning of nationality has faded away too. 
Being Canadian is not different from being American or Mexican in this respect. Yet, the 
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scope of the actual rights the enjoyment of which the possession of the status of each 
particular nationality brings varies to a great extent. In this respect Canadian and Mexican 
nationalities are certainly very different. The same is impossible in the EU where the 
principle of non-discrimination on the basis  of  nationality  is the core element of  the 
Community legal order. As has been demonstrated  in Part  II supra, the  actual rights 
specific to any particular Community nationality are not numerous at all. In this context, 
the status of EU citizenship – not the nationality one of the Member States –comes to the 
fore  as  the  main  generator  of  rights  in  the  Union.  Notwithstanding  the  fact  that  EU 
citizenship  is  directly  rooted  in  the  possession  of  a  Member  State’s  nationality  for 
Community law purposes, it is not the nationality itself, but the ius tractum legal status at 
Community level that is responsible for the majority of rights enjoyed by the nationals of 
the Member States in the EU at the moment.  
Since all the nationalities of the Member States provide access to the same single 
status of EU citizenship from which the rights are then derived, the possibility for one 
Member  State  to have  a  ‘better  nationality’  as  far  as  the scope of  rights  enjoyed  in 
connection with it is concerned, is non-existent, legally speaking at least. Consequently, 
unable  to  claim  any  differences  in  terms  of  the  ‘essence’  of  their  nationalities,  the 
Member States also lost a possibility to claim any differences in terms of rights their 
nationalities bring.
157 Treating a Union citizen not in possession of the local nationality 
worse than the locals is prohibited by Community law. 
Ironically,  the  Member  States  are  still  able  to  treat  some  individuals  in  their 
territory worse than others based on nationality, as the locals not possessing a nationality 
of some other Member State fall within the shade of reverse discrimination. All in all, 
while no nationality in the Community can possibly be ‘better’ or more ‘substantive’ than 
any other, generally, possessing only the nationality of the state of residence can trigger 
legalised  discrimination.  Demonstrating  the  second  Community  nationality  to  the 
authorities in this respect is an easy way out, as the ECJ has demonstrated in Garcia 
Avello.
158   
In a situation where the nationalities of the Member States are unable to trigger 
differentiation  between  their  owners,  the  requirement  to  give  up  one  Community 
nationality upon receiving another largely means an exchange between identical statuses. 
Since it is EU citizenship,  not the Member States’  nationalities  themselves,  which is 
responsible for the essence of the Member States’ nationals’ legal status (once again, 
reverse discrimination remains a notable exception in this context), swapping Member 
States’ nationalities de facto means exchanging EU citizenship status for EU citizenship 
status. Article 12 EC ensures that any difference in treatment as a result of such swap is 
prohibited. 
Leaving the activation of reverse discrimination and unconditional access to the 
territory aside, possession of the nationality of a particular Member State brings with it 
two meaningful rights in the Community: political representation at the national level and 
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access  to  civil  service  employment.  All  other  things  equal,  the  requirement  of 
renunciation of one’s previous Community nationality should be regarded in the context 
of access to these two rights. Given the procedural nature of Community nationalities as 
well as the obvious fact that all the Member States already connect the possession of their 
nationalities with the acceptance of liberal ideology and democracy, human rights and the 
rule of law ideals, it is clear that no substantial demands can reasonably be addressed to 
EU citizens in the context of naturalisation in the Member State of residence. Ability to 
speak a local language seems to be the only possible exception in this regard. 
The requirement to give up one’s previous nationality is a strong discouraging 
factor, preventing the naturalisation of long-term residents. This is particularly so given 
the lack of any possible obvious reasons behind the requirement: in a situation where the 
bond between the socio-cultural understanding of a nation and nationality as a legal status 
does not exist  any more, and  where EU citizenship gains  in importance  as  the  main 
source of rights for all the nationals of the Member States, to ask for renunciation of the 
previous nationality is meaningless. Those considering naturalisation need to balance the 
idea of compliance with a meaningless requirement against the prospect of being granted 
the two rights which are reserved to the nationals. 
While the requirement to give up the previous nationality is discouraging, it is 
often  also  the  only  factor  playing  against  naturalisation  in  one’s  Member  State  of 
residence,  since  language  proficiency  is  usually  not  a  problem  upon  completion  of 
several years of residence required for naturalisation. Agreeing with Evans,  
 
The  potential  for  Community  nationals  to  acquire  the  nationality  of  a  second 
Member  State  is  already  considerable.  National  authorities  tend  to  rely  on 
immigration control in order to limit access to naturalisation. Since beneficiaries 
of  freedom  of  movement  are  not  subject  to  such  control,  many  Community 




Keeping the requirement of renunciation of one’s previous nationality achieves 
only one practical goal: to make sure that EU citizens from other Member States are 
excluded  from  the  franchise  at  the  national  level  and  that  they  do  not  occupy  high-
standing positions in public service. Such motivation hardly contributes to building an 
ever closer Union between the peoples of the Member States. In fact, it actually seems to 
contradict the principles of Article 6(1) EC, especially with regard to democracy. By 
definition ‘in order to make representative government function properly, it must be truly 
representative  of  all  its  constituent  groups’.
160  EU  citizens  enter  on  the  basis  of 
Community law and are treated equally with the locals, thus making part of the society of 
their Member State of residence: the Member State itself can only accept and is unable to 
change this reality. Blocking access of such people to franchise comes down to refusing 
to acknowledge the fact that they make part of the people of the Member State.
161 All EU 
citizens residing in a particular Member State, no matter whether nationals or not, fall 
within the scope of this notion by virtue of being able to elect MEPs and get elected to 
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the EP themselves on the quota reserved for the ‘people’ of the Member State where they 
reside.
162 
The same logic should apply to third country nationals too, especially given that, 
as  Lardy  has  compellingly  demonstrated,  the  arguments  for  disenfranchising  those 
residents who are not in possession of the nationality of the state where they reside do not 
exist.
163 Largely  similar  observations  apply  to  the  right  of  access  to  civil  service 
employment.  While  to  presume  that  non-nationals  cannot  cope  with  such  jobs  since 
nationality provides one with some new insight is silly, to assume that a Belgian national 
judge  in  Luxembourg  would  abuse  her  position  in  the  interests  of  the  country  of 
nationality  is  not  smart  either.  Given  that  all  the  Member  States  embrace  the  same 
ideology and are joined in the EU to achieve the same objectives,
164 such a possibility 
might never arise.   
There  are  more  considerations,  however,  which  enable  presenting  the 
renunciation requirement in not so attractive a light. Since states are free to establish rules 
with regard to acquisition and loss of nationality, some of them opted for making their 
nationalities  non-renounceable,  as  did  Greece,  for  instance.  Should  a  Greek  want  to 
naturalise  in  Latvia,  the  renunciation  requirement  will  not  apply  because  such 
renunciation  is  impossible.  This  shows  that  the  Member  States  which  require 
renunciation are de facto unable to control the practical functioning of this requirement, 
adding to its arbitrariness. This consideration is not only valid in the legal context of 
Community law and potentially can have a negative impact of the naturalised citizens due 
to the recurrent attempts to exclude dual nationals from political life in the countries 
where dual nationality is not accepted. Since the countries not allowing for renunciation 
of their nationality are  well  known  (such as Morocco), in  the majority of cases any 
policies  targeting  dual  nationals  come  down  to  petty  nationalism,  trying  to  exclude 
persons belonging to minorities, even after they naturalise in the country, from being 
fully-fledged citizens of it. 
In the light of the considerations restated above, it is impossible to disagree with 
Evans’ observation that the ‘relaxation of restrictions on possession of dual nationality 
seems to be demanded by the spirit, if not the letter of Community law’.
165 Ideally, this 
should not only concern EU citizens, but also third country nationals, who are equally 
affected by this requirement which makes no sense.  
  The Member States are in the position to remedy the current problems in three 
different  ways  at least.  This can be done either  by  amending national  legislation, by 
concluding  an  international  agreement
166 or  by  EC  Treaty  amendment.  All  the  three 
possible directions will require active participation of all the Member States, which is 
logical as all the Member  States are potentially affected by any change of naturalisation 
regimes in the law of their peers. Even those Member States which do not have, or do not 
enforce the renunciation requirement
167 potentially have a direct interest in its abolition 
elsewhere, as it directly affects the access of their nationals to political participation in 
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the  Member  States  where  they  reside.  Also  the  Union’s  interest  in  abolition  of  the 
renunciation requirements in the Member States should presumably be strong, as such a 
move would reconfirm the bonds of the Union existing between the Member States and 
the importance of the status of EU citizenship. 
  The first and most obvious way to improve the current state of affairs in the inter-
Member State naturalisations of EU citizens in the Community is exclusively related to 
the removal of nonsense requirements from the naturalisation legislation of the Member 
States by the Member States themselves.
168 The requirement of renunciation of one’s 
previous nationality is the first candidate for removal. In fact, there is a decipherable 
trend in the naturalisation legislation of the Member States, demonstrating the fading of 
the popularity of this requirement in the recent decades, as more and more Member States 
abolish  it.
169 Given  that,  as  demonstrated  above,  this  requirement  is  often  the  only 
deterring factor preventing EU citizens from naturalising in their new Member State of 
residence, the practical consequences of its abolition will increase EU citizens’ ability to 
demand full inclusion in their Member States of residence on genuinely and absolutely 
equal terms with the locals. 
A  distinction  between  two  possible  approaches  to  the  abolition  of  the 
denunciation requirement in the national law of the Member States can be made. Such 
abolition can apply either to all or only to non-Community nationalities (which is the 
current German practice). It seems that the latter approach is not at all wise, as by lifting 
the requirement for the Community nationalities only the Member States are only likely 
to underline  the  requirement’s  illogical nature. Given the lack of  principle difference 
between Community nationalities such a requirement can also be presented as cynical, as 
the rights of those not in possession of EU citizenship are very much dependent on the 
prospect of acquiring the latter status, especially given that the gap between the rights of 
EU citizens and third country nationals in the EU is short of unbridgeable. On the other 
hand, such a half-way solution can be easier to sell in the Member States which are 
particularly outdated in their thinking about nationality, citizenship and belonging. It is 
thus not surprising that Germany adopted precisely this approach. 
  What is much more important in connection with the German choice, is that it 
seems to be starting a potentially far-reaching trend in the approaches to nationality in the 
Member States which is likely to have deep effect on the status of EU citizenship. This 
trend, to which Italian and Austrian naturalisation requirements equally testify, consists 
in  adopting  generally  different  naturalisation  requirements  for  EU  citizens  and  third 
country  nationals.  While  it  is  likely  to  contribute  to  the  deepening  of  the  legal  gap 
dividing the EU citizens and long term resident third country nationals in the Community, 
it  also  signals  the  rising  importance  of  the  distinction  between  EU  citizenship  and 
Member  State  nationalities.  When  stricter  requirements  apply  at  naturalisation  in  a 
Member State to third country nationals only, not to EU citizens, it means that the law on 
naturalisation evolves towards having two different procedures in place: one designed to 
become  an  EU  citizen,  another,  merely  a  Member  State  national.  This  is  a  logical 
development  in  the  light  of the  general convergence of the  substance of Community 
nationalities described above. Observing the current limited moves in this direction big 
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changes  in  the  dynamics  of  interaction  between  EU  citizenship  and  Member  States’ 
nationalities can be predicted: the legal detachment of the two is on the way, contributing 
to the importance of the EU citizenship status which the current naturalisation law in the 
majority of the Member States fails to acknowledge. 
  While  the  approach  described  above  can  be  branded  as  a  Member  States-
dominated ‘bottom – up’ change, two other approaches worth mentioning here are more 
Communitarian in nature.  
So the  second possible way  to deal with the problems of  inter-Member  State 
naturalisations  of  EU  citizens  in  the  European  Union  is  not  concerned  with  the 
naturalisations as such, but with the problems, which such naturalisations are intended to 
solve. Since naturalisation in the Member State of residence ultimately means access to 
civil service employment and political participation at the national level in that Member 
State,  amending  the  EC  Treaty  with  a  view  to  including  these  rights  among  EU 
citizenship rights is actually the most logical way to solve the problems of those EU 
citizens  who  are  not  granted  access  to  these  rights  since  they  are  deterred  from 
naturalising  in  the  Member  State  of  residence.  It  is  clear  that  including  these  rights 
among  EU  citizenship  rights  will  annihilate  Member  States  nationalities  as  legally 
meaningful concepts.  
Middle-house solutions are also possible. The rights which are currently specific 
to  Member  States’    nationalities  can  be  granted  upon  meeting  a  certain  residency 
requirement  for  instance,  introducing  a  different  approach  compared  with  a  virtually 
unconditional non-discrimination right of Article 19 EC.
170 
Whatever option is chosen, ultimately, there will remain no possible need for EU 
citizens to naturalise in their new Member State of residence as such naturalisations will 
not be bringing them any rights besides those which they already enjoy in their capacity 
of EU citizens – a direct parallel with the possession of a residence permit in a Member 
State other than your own can be made:
171 while it is probably nice to have it, it does not 
per se grant you any rights. Such development, should Community law move in this 
direction, can only be welcomed. While there are no losers as a result of such change, 
since EU citizenship and EC non-discrimination has already successfully challenged any 
meaningful content of Member States’ nationalities, all the EU citizens exercising their 
free movement rights are likely to be better off. 
  A somewhat more ‘extreme’ (from the national sovereign perspective) option is 
directly connected with the death of nationalities in the EU. Once political participation at 
the national level and access to civil service employment both become EU citizenship 
rights attached to the residence of the persons concerned, it makes little sense legally to 
refer to such persons by underlining their connection with the initial Member State of 
nationality. Once it is supplanted by residence as a requirement initiating access to full 
rights in the new Member State, the use of nationality even in the formal legal sense 
would  not  have  any  added  value  any  more,  following  the  approach  to 
citizenship/nationality  adopted  in  the  majority  of  the  world’s  federations.  Born  as  a 
citizen of Kentucky the US citizen moving to California effectively becomes a citizen of 
California,  as the  legal  connection with Kentucky, meaningful as  long  as  the  citizen 
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resides their, evaporates with the change of residence.
172 Although this might sound like 
fantasizing in the EU context, the Union is actually quite close to such reinvention of 
citizenship. However unlikely, it does not seem unthinkable anymore. 
  The ways of shaping the legal-political realities described in each of the scenarios 
vary. The first scenario requires either the amendment of the law of the Member States 
alone, or an amendment of the law of the Member States accompanied by an international 
agreement between them which would specify that renunciation requirements (as well as 
other outright unreasonable obstacles on the way of EU citizens’ naturalisation in the 
Member States of residence) should be prohibited. The second and the third scenarios 
will without any doubt require EC Treaty amendment. The potentially far-reaching nature 
of the third scenario would also require an overwhelming reshuffling of  national law of 
all the Member States. 
   
 
Abolition of Nationalities – To Be Continued (As  a Conclusion) 
There  is  no  reason  to  believe  that  the  process  of  legal  marginalisation  of  the 
nationalities of the Member States in the EU will stop or be reversed. The contrary seems 
more likely – the dynamics of legal marginalisation of nationalities is likely to intensify 
in the near future, as it will be clearer for the Member States authorities and for the EU 
citizens  alike,  that  the  status  provided  by  the  Community  is  potentially  and  also 
practically more important for all the individuals in possession of it, than any Member 
State nationality as such. Whether or not the Member State nationality will survive as a 
legal status connecting individuals and the European Community, it will certainly mutate 
to a considerable extent under the international pressures of human rights and liberalism 
and the Community pressures of the internal market and non-discrimination on the basis 
of nationality.  The result of  this mutation  will necessarily  be  a  legal status  which is 
substantially different from the nationalities of the Member States today, as it is bound to 
become  more  aware  of  its  own  limitations.  This  reinvention  of  nationality  will 
necessarily result in critical scrutiny of all its attributes which are taken for granted in the 
law of the Member States today. Irrelevant and antiquarian requirements of naturalisation, 
for instance, will be bound to go no matter which scenario of future development of 
nationality is to become operational. 
The  most  imminent  development  to  come  is  the  parting  of  ways  of  access  to 
Community  nationality  and  EU  citizenship.  Those  in  possession  of  EU  citizenship 
already are likely to be included much easier compared  the third country nationals, who 
once again, risk to remain excluded. The parting of ways of naturalisation depending on 
which  status  is  to  be  acquired  –  EU  citizenship  (together  with  a  Member  State’s 
nationality) or only a nationality of a Member State, will intensify the binary dynamic of 
citizenship  development  outlined  by  Joppke.  Nationalities  of  the  Member  States  are 
likely  to  be  de-ethnicised  faster  upon  the  introduction  of  simpler  naturalisation 
requirements for EU citizens in the growing number of Member States. Re-ethnicisation 
will soon fallow in compensation, contributing to the further deterritorialisation of the 
Member States. With the increase in intensity of de- and re-ethnicisation the ultimate 
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legal meaning of the Member States’ nationalities will be fading away next to the status 
of EU citizenship. In this context the wholly internal situations will have to be dealt with, 
depriving the Member State nationalities of one of their most important functions and 
increasing the rights of EU citizens.  
In  the  context  of  acute  articulation  of  differences  between  Member  State 
nationalities and EU citizenship third country nationals who are long term residents in the 
Community  seem  to be  the  only  group  who  is  likely  to  gain  little.  Should  different 
naturalisation regimes persist for them, the absurd situation of accessing the main status 
of interest for them i.e. that of EU citizenship via (more than) twenty seven different 
ways is there to stay. Harmonisation of access to the status of EU citizenship is unlikely 
to result in the improvement of their situation however, as it will necessarily undermine 
the possibility for some of them to rely on the discrepancies in the national rules of the 
Member  States.  A middle  solution proposed  in  this paper  offers a  way to solve this 
dilemma. 
In  a  situation  when  nationalities  are  likely  to  play  a  merely  symbolic  role,  the 
likelihood of the proliferation of petty nationalism will be increasing as the discovery that 
something the majorities in each Member State believe in means virtually nothing and is 
bound to go and never to come back is certainly a loss, even if an ephemeral one. The 
Community can moan together with its citizens
173 and move on. 
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